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JAIN BHAWAN
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Contents

Neminatha with Ambika
From Sulgi, Bankura District, West Bengal

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Teachings of Lord Mahavira
Jainism Classical and Original

K. R. CHANDRA

Religion is prominently associated with the mankind and therefore, it is generally said to be as old as man. Every religion claims that it is the oldest one and Jainism also professes the same. Authenticity of this claim depends on the availability of concrete evidences. On the basis of some indirect Vedic references and archaeological remains of Mohenjodaro attempts have been made to prove the antiquity of Jainism but scholars are not unanimous on this point. On the basis of some non-controversial evidences from the Pali canon and the Hindu *Purāṇas* the historicity of Lord Parsva is proved and Lord Rsabha is accepted as the first Tirthankara of the Jainas. About the historicity of Lord Nemi, the cousin brother of Lord Krsna there is still no unanimous opinion among the scholars.

Jainism does not believe in the God-creator and the *Vedas* therefore, it is regarded as an atheist religion (*nāstika-dharma*). Really speaking it can not be branded as such because it believes in the existence of the soul (*ātmā*), the capacity of every soul to become a God and the migratory nature of the soul from one life to another because of its own deeds (*karma*). According to Jainism the universe (*loka*) is beginningless and endless.

Jainism belongs to the school of Pluralistic realism because it believes in many individual and independent souls (*nānātmavāda*) and it has conceived of six different substances or realities (*ṣaḍdravya*)—the living entity or the soul and the five non-living entities such as the matter (*pudgala*), the medium of motion (*dharma*), the medium of rest (*adharma*), the space (*ākāśa*) and the time (*kāla*). It is also a dualistic school as it accepts two fundamental substances viz., the living and the non-living (*jīva* and *ajīva*). It is also said to be a monistic school of philosophy as it believes in all the entities existent (*sat*). So to say 'Reality is Existence

and Existence is Reality' for it. Again the first five substances are conceived to be extensive (*astikāya*) as they occupy many space-points whereas the last one the time is not extensive as one time point never combines with the other one. In this way the realities are classified according to the individual nature of entity, dichotomy and existence.

Fundamental characteristic of the soul is said to be '*upayoga*' which consists of the knowledge having its object as universal entity (*darśana*) and the knowledge having its object as a particular entity (*jñāna*). Souls are of two kinds—worldly (*samsārī*) and liberated (*siddha*). The worldly soul is the knower (*jñātā*), the agent (*kartā*), the enjoyer (*bhoktā*), equal in extent to its own body (*śarīrapramāṇa*), different in each body and possessor of material *karmas* (*karmaśarīra*). Keeping in view the liberation of the soul an ethical classification is conceived of nine categories viz, the living being (*jīva*), the non-living being (*ajīva*), the virtue (*punya*), the vice (*pāpa*), the influx (*āśrava*), the bondage (*bandha*), the prevention (*samvara*), the annihilation (*nirjarā*) and the emancipation (*mokṣa*). According to some the virtue and the vice come under the influx as well as bondage and therefore only seven categories are recognised.

Knowledge (*jñāna*) is said to be of five kinds—sensory (*ābhinibodhika*, i.e. of *indriya* and *manah*), scriptural (*śruta*), limited direct knowledge (*avadhi*), direct knowledge of the modes of other's mind (*manahparyāya*) and the perfect (omniscience) knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*). The first two are considered as indirect (*parokṣa*) and latter two as direct (*pratyakṣa*).

Being a realistic system Jainism propounds that every substance undergoes origination and decay as well as it is permanent (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṁ-sat*). It does not believe in absolute permanence (*kūtastha-nityatā*) or absolute momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) The substance is permanent if we take into account its ultimate nature and it is impermanent for having origination and decay.

Substances have infinite attributes and we have to consider a substance as describable or indescribable at a single time. A substance can be said to be one or many if we consider its ultimate nature or various modes. At any given time one can describe a thing from a particular aspect or from a particular point of view and naturally partial truth is stated. This is the theory of Relativity of Judgement (*syādvāda*). Jainas are the exponents of this non-absolute theory (*anekāntavāda*) and they form a special school in the Indian philosophical system. *Anekāntavāda* is based on various view-points and the Jainas have developed the theory

of different attitudes (*naya*). According to the individual attitude any one quality of the object can be described and the *nayas* in their totality (*pramāṇa*) describe the object as a whole. The mode of describing any one quality or aspect without rejecting the rest is called *syādvāda*. There can be so many standpoints or *nayas* but generally all come under the two—identity of things (from the point of view of substance i.e., *dravyārthika-naya*) and difference of things (from the point of view of modes i.e., *paryāyārthika naya*).

The law of cause and effect is the *karmavāda*. It governs the entire phenomena whether physical or psychic. An effect in turn itself becomes the cause and the chain continues. Fine karmic atoms (*karma-rajah*) makes its influx into the soul due to one's action or activity of body, speech and mind. This causes bondage (*bandha*) which is of four kinds : Nature (*prakṛti*), Duration (*sthiti*), Intensity (*anubhāga*) and Quantity (*pradeśa*). Nature and quantity of the *karmas* depend upon the degree of passions (*kaṣāya*) : attachment and aversion (*rāga* and *dveṣa*) or anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*). The nature of *karmas* is eightfold : intuition obscuring (*darśanāvaranīya*), knowledge obscuring (*jñānāvaranīya*), feeling producing (*vedanīya*), faith and conduct obstructing (*mohanīya*), age determining (*āyu*), body determining (*nāma*), status determining (*gotra*) and power-hindering (*antarāya*). The *karmas* cause transmigration of souls from one life to another life.

A soul on the path to liberation makes continuous spiritual progress and for that fourteen stages (*guṇasthāna*) are conceived, beginning with the wrong believer (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) and terminating into the state of absolute motionless (*ayogīkevalī*). These stages are gradually attained on the basis of progress made as regards belief, knowledge and conduct. In the last stage the soul makes itself free from all the *karmas*, manifests its innate faculties and attains unembodied emancipation.

Souls are in bondage from the beginningless time and the goal is that of emancipation which can be attained by prevention (*saṁvara*) and annihilation (*nirjarā*) of the *karmas*. Prevention is possible by following certain vows (*vrata*), carefulnesses (*samiti*), restraints (*gupti*), moral virtues (*dharma*), meditations (*anuprekṣā*), endurances (*parīṣaha-jaya*) and the code of right conduct (*cāritra*). Annihilation results from performing penances (*tapa*) which is twofold, internal (*ābhyantara*) and external (*bāhya*). Religious conduct (*ācāradharma*) is also twofold, one meant for the monks (*śramaṇa*) and the other for the house-holders (*upāsaka*). The former consists of greater vows (*mahā-vrata*) and the latter of lesser vows (*aṇu-vrata*), i.e. the vows to be followed entirely or

partially respectively. When the soul is freed from the defilements it becomes pure and manifests its innate nature which consists of infinite knowledge (*ananta jñāna*), infinite intuition (*ananta-darśana*), infinite power (*ananta-vīrya*) and infinite bliss (*ananta-sukha*).

This is a brief account of the classical Jainism which has come down to us till today. Every religion and philosophy undergoes a continuous process of evolution and the same is the case with Jainism. However the original form of Jainism can be known from the original works of the Jainas.

The oldest available literature of the Jainas is the Ardhamagadhi canonical literature (*āgamaśruta*). Traditionally it consists of fortyfive books but all of them do not belong to one and the same period. Out of them the twelve *Aṅga* books are earlier. The tradition further says that whatever was taught by Lord Mahavira was put into the form of language by his first disciples (*gaṇadhara*) in these twelve *Aṅga* books. Monks were required to study these twelve books and no mention of other-*Āgama* books is there in this respect. Again these *Aṅga* books are not composed by a single person and in one and the same period as the subject matter and the form of their language reveal. The first two *Anga* books (*Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*) and in them also their first parts (*prathama śrutaskandha*) are old which seem to be nearer the original words of Lord Mahavira. The language of these portions appear to be as old as that of the oldest portions of Pali *Tripitaka* which contains the teachings of Lord Buddha.

As far as the original teachings of Lord Mahavira are concerned we have to rely upon these oldest portions. Chronologically thereafter comes the place of second parts (*dvītiya śrutaskandha*) of the above two *Aṅgas*. The place of other *Aṅga* and *Āgama* books such as the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, *Prajñāpaṇā*, *Jīvājīvābhīgama*, *Sthānāṅga* and *Samavāyāṅga* is later in which we find a continuous development of the Jaina doctrines. Even in these *Āgama* books we seldom find logical discussions or the use of dialectics. This kind of discussion belongs to still a later period which is generally known as the *dārśanika-yuga*.

What we have described above is the developed form of the teachings of Lord Mahavira and now we shall deal with the original one based on the earliest portions mentioned above.

The nomenclature of the first *Aṅga* book (*Ācārāṅga*) itself shows that it deals with the conduct and that also of the monks. The second *Aṅga*

book (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*) also does the same but in addition there is criticism of other religious systems. In the former work some themes are propounded whereas in the latter work there is exposition of the same. These two works or so to say the original teachings of Lord Mahavira primarily lay stress on monkhood or renunciation of the world (*śramaṇa-dharma*). The life of a householder (*gṛhastha*) is despised upon. The only vow that is to be accepted by a monk is that of equanimity (*sāmāyika*) and that is explained as follows : 'All the living beings desire happiness, no one likes suffering and death. And therefore, no living being should be hurt.' Thus non-injury (*ahiṁsā*) results from equanimity and from non-injury follow the other vows but they are specifically not mentioned in the *Ācārāṅga*. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* refers to five blemishes (*doṣa*) which can be identified with the five principal vows of the Jaina conduct. The main cause of bondage is said to be the tendency of possession (*parigraha*) which leads to all blemishes like hurting of living beings, etc. (*hiṁsā, asatya, steya* etc.) This was the main reason why Lord Mahavira preferred the path of nudity (*acela-dharma*). But this path was an extreme in itself therefore, it did not flourish in its absolute form and a convenient and lenient practice permitting limited robes came into existence in the form of the Svetambara sect and the Bhattaraka (Digambara) system.

On the basis of the material body and the movability of living beings calssification into six types (*ṣad-jīva-nikāya*) the earth, the water, the fire, the air, the vegetation and the moving beings is available. Both the moving (*trasa*) and the non-moving (*sthāvara*) classes are also mentioned but their order is yet not fixed. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the movables are further specified on the basis of their origination (*yoni*).

The living being (*jīva*) is synonymously referred to as *'ātmā'*, *'citta'*, *'cittamanta'*, as well as *'prāṇa'*, *'bhūta'* and *'sattva'*. There is no distinction between these terms. Non-living is called *'acitta'* or *'acetana'*, i.e., non-conscious. Thet echnical term *'ajīva'* denoting the non-living has still not found place in the system. The technical term *dravya* (substance), the principle of six substances (*ṣaddravya*), the theory of extensivity of the five substances (*jīva, ajīva, dharma, adharma* and *ākāśa* as *astikāya*) and non-extensivity of the last substance (*kāla*) find place in later Agamic works when the necessity arises for the definition of the universe. The infinity and beginninglessness of the universe are referred to only in the second part of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga.*

However, plurality of souls or living beings is referred to in the *Ācārāṅga* : *jīva anegā santi pāṇā puḍhosiyā*. There are many living

beings and they are separate and independent. Thus from the very beginning Jainism believed in Pluralism.

The chief attribute of the soul is said to be knowledge (*vijñāna*). The soul is the knower and the knower is the soul (*je ātā se vinnātā je vinnātā se ātā*). The technical term used in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* to denote the chief attribute of the soul is '*upayoga*' which stands for intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) simultaneously. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* further adds that the soul is the doer (*kartā*) as well as the enjoyer (*bhoktā*).

In the *Ācārāṅga* the soul is said to be formless and in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* different from the material body. Again in the *Ācārāṅga* it is said to be neither big nor small (*se na dīhe na hasse*) and thereby the *Sūtra* conveys that the soul is all pervading but in later Agamic works it is accepted as having the size of the body it occupies. For example in the *Bhagavatī-sūtra* and the *Uttarādhyayana* it is said to be equal in size to the extension of its body and explained to be even equal to the size of the universe, that it attains by the process of '*samudghāta*'

Foundations of the systematic ethical classification into seven (*sapta-padārtha*) and nine (*nava-tattva*) categories can be seen only in the second part of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. In the *Ācārāṅga* we do not find all of them referred to at one place. Out of the nine the '*citta, acitta, āsrava, puṇya, pāpa, bandha, nirjarā* and *mokṣa*' find mention at one or the other place in one or the other way but the '*samvara*' (prevention of the influx of *karmas*) is not referred to.

Technical terms like '*avadhi, manah-paryāya* and *kevala*' denoting different kinds of knowledge are found in the second parts of both the *Aṅga-books*, whereas the words used in their older portions are '*dṛṣṭa, śruta, mata* and *vijñāna*' (the knowledge of the sight, the ear, the mind and the higher knowledge). The final categorisation into the five kinds of knowledge (*mati, śruta, avadhi, manah-paryāya* and *kevala*) is found in later Agamic works.

The theme of *karmavāda* (fruits according to one's own deeds) and *punarjanma* (transmigration) is found in the *Ācārāṅga*. It specifically states that some do not know wherefrom they have come, from the east or .. . . Is my soul taking rebirth ? .. Who am I ? And from here where shall I be born again. (*ihamegesiṁ no saṇṇā bhavati, taṁ jahā puratthimāo vā diśao āgao ahamamsi ......, atthi me āyā uvavāie .., ke aham asi ke vā io cuo iha peccā bhavissāmi*). It is further said in the same book

that the tendency of possession (*parigraha*) is the main cause of unending transmigration (*mahābhava-bandhana*). Non-possession as well as non-attachment is the main religious doctrine. Possession is said to be of two kinds external and internal, i.e., attachment to relations (as well as wealth) and passions.

Details of the *karma* philosophy like the nature of the *karma* and its eight varieties : nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga*) and quantity (*pradeśa*) get place in later canonical works. Fourteen stages of spiritual progress (*guṇasthāna*) have not found place even upto the time of the composition of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*.

In the *Ācārāṅga* we do not find references to *anekāntavāda*, *saptabhaṅgī*, *naya* and *pramāṇa*. Seeds of *anekānta* are there but the theme of sevenfold judgement has no place in it. No thought is given to the *naya* and *pramāṇa*. The method of replaying by dividing a subject into various parts (*vibhajyavāda*) is found in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and the *anekāntavāda* (multiplicity of stand-points) seems to have evolved from it at a later period.

In the *Ācārāṅga* emancipation from the karmic body (*karma-śarīra*) is preached to attain liberation which is variously called as '*siddhi*, *mokṣa* and *nirvāṇa*'. Ultimately it means emancipation from bondage. It is attained by non-injury, meditation and superknowledge (*ahiṃsā*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*). The terms seem to be older which were prevalent in other contemporary systems also. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* liberation is said to be attained by *jñāna*, *darśana* and *śīla* (knowledge, intuition and chastity). This order of the three terms differs from the classical order found in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* where it is *darśana*, *jñāna* and *cāritra*. Formerly the emphasis was on the *prajñā* (super-knowledge) but later it passed on to *cāritra* (the right conduct). The five vows (*pañcavrata*) and the renouncement of meal in the night are specifically prescribed in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. In its second part the term *cāritra* is employed in place of the *śīla* and that prevails throughout continuously.

Technical terms like *Sarvajña*, *Sarvadarśī* and *Tīrthaṅkara* are not there in the first part of *Ācārāṅga*. It employs the words like *Buddha*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Lokavipaśyan*, *Paramacakṣu*, *Vedavid*, *Jñānavān* in place of *Kevalī*. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* '*savva*' and '*ananta*' adjectives are prefixed to them, e.g., *anantacakṣu*, *anantajñānadarśī*, *anantajñānī*, *jagatasarvadarśī*, etc. The terms like *Vedavid* and *Brāhmaṇa* show the influence of the Vedic tradition.

This account proves that Lord Mahavira was not an atheist (*nāstika*). He in the beginning of the *Ācārāṅga* tells us that he believes in the existence of the souls, their transmigration, deeds and fruits and the theory of exertion or free will (*āyāvādī, logavādī, kammavādi* and *kiriyāvādi*). In the first part of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* a *kiriyāvādī* is said to be one who believes in the existence of souls, the influx, the misery, the stoppage and the annihilation of the *karmas*. The soul is said to be an independent entity and there is no annihilation of it with the destruction of the body. Fruition as well as free will are there and there is no incarnation (*avatāra-vāda*) of any soul which has once attained the emancipation. There is criticism of agnosticism (*ajñānavāda*), fatalism (*niyativāda*), momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) and those who believe in the God as a creator (*īśvaravāda*) and the world as delusion (*māyāvāda*).

Some types of celestial beings are mentioned in the first part of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* but the four-fold classification of celestial beings is not there. However, the three fold division of the universe has clear cut mention in it. Topics that are discussed in the later Agamic books are : denizens of the netherland (*nārakī*), classification of living beings according to the number of their senses, details regarding intuition, knowledge, psychic faculty and passions, various kinds of bondage, minute details of the *karma*, various kinds of penances, position and condition of the liberated souls, mythology of sixtythree illustrious personages, geography, cosmology, etc. Logical discussions are seldom found in the *Āgamas*. Verbal authority (*āpta-vacana*) is predominant. The whole system of dialectics is a later development during the period of systematisation of philosophical principles (*dārśanika-yuga*).

Reference Books

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The Jain Concept of Kevalajnana in the Light of Modern Researches in Thanatology

ARVIND SHARMA

Kevalajñāna

Jainism may briefly be summarized as that religion which accepts the five extensibles (*astikāyas*)[1], the six substances (*dravyas*),[2] the seven principles (*tattvas*)[3] and the nine categories (*padārthas*).[4] But the goal towards which the religion tends as a whole is ultimately the achievement of *kevalajñāna*, "which refers to the nature of infinite knowledge which the soul attains as the result of complete liberation or *mokṣa*".[5]

What is the nature of this *kevalajñāna*? It seems that until now scholars have tried to answer this question either ontologically[6] or epis-

[1] S. Gopalan, *Outlines of Jainism* (New York . Halsted Press, 1973) p. 122.

[2] S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (University of Calcutta, 1968) pp 90-91.

[3] M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London . George Allen & Unwin Ltd , 1932) p 161.

[4] Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ed., *The Cultural Heritage of India* Vol. I (Calcutta : The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1958) p. 403.

[5] Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ed., *op. cit* , pp. 427-428.

[6] M. Hiriyanna writes (*op cit* , pp 158-159) ·

Perfect enlightenment being of the very nature of self, its condition of partial or indistinct knowledge marks a lapse from it. Accordingly the senses and the *manas*, though they are aids to knowing from one standpoint, are from another so many indications of the limitation to which the *jiva* is subject during its earthly pilgrimage. This leads to the recognition of differences in the extent of enlightenment that a self may possess as a result of the removal of less or more of the obstacles to it But no self without *jnana* is conceivable, or *jnana* without a self—a point in the doctrine which well illustrates its distinction from Buddhism. . . . The culmination of enlightenment is reached when the obstacles are broken down in their entirety. Then the individual *jiva* while continuing as such, becomes omniscient and knows all objects vividly and precisely as they are That is called *kevala-jnana* or absolute apprehension without media or doubt and is what Mahavira is believed to have attained at the end of the long period of his penance. It is immediate knowledge and is described as *kevala* ('pure') since it arises of itself without the help of any external aid like the senses, etc It is 'soul-knowledge', if we may so term it—knowledge in its pristine form and is designated *mukhyapratyaksa* or perception *par excellence* to contrast it with common perception (*samvyavaharika-pratyaksa*). There are other but lower varieties of this supernormal knowledge recognized in the school, but it is not necessary to describe them here

temologically.[7] In this paper an attempt will be made to answer the question from the point of view of thanatology.

Thanatology

Until recently scientific investigation in the West seems to have been so steeped in materialism that any evidence of some form of postmortem existence or experience was not taken seriously. As a result of the efforts of people like Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, the experience of death and near-death experiences are being taken more seriously. Some evidence on this point was collected and presented by Dr Raymond A. Moody, Jr. in *Life After Life*.[8] He has now followed this book up with another—*Reflections On Life After Life*[9]

It will now be argued that this latter work seems to contain material which may throw some light on the Jain concept of *kevalajñāna*. Dr. Moody writes on the basis of "the report of subjects who had near-death encounters of extreme duration" thus :

> Several people have told me that during their encounters with "death" they got brief glimpses of an entire separate realm of existence in which all knowledge—whether of past, present or future—seemed to co-exist in a sort of timeless state. Alternately, this has been described as a moment of enlightenment in which the subject seemed to have complete knowledge. In trying to talk about this aspect of their experience, all have commented that this experience was ultimately inexpressible Also, all agree that this feeling of complete knowledge

[7] A. L. Basham explains (R C. Zaehner, ed , *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths* (Boston Beacon Press, 1967) p 265 :
Jainism is not, however, a fatalistic system The tendency to fatalism is strongly opposed by Jain philosophers, and the apparent determinism of Jain cosmology is explained by a remarkable and distinctive theory of epistemological relativity known as "the doctrine of manysidedness" (*anekantavada*) The details of this system are too recondite to discuss here, but its essential kernel is that the truth of any proposition is relative to the point of view from which it is made The ebb and flow of the cosmic process is from the universal point of view rigidly determined, but from the viewpoint of the individual a man has freedom to work out his own salvation. Free will and determinism are both relatively true, and only the fully emancipated soul, who surveys the whole of time and space in a single act of knowledge from his eternal station at the top of the universe, can know the full and absolute truth.

[8] Raymond A Moody, Jr , *Life After Life* (Atlanta · Mockingbird Books, 1975)

[9] Raymond A. Moody, Jr., *Reflections On Life After Life* (New York : Bantam Books, 1977)

did not persist after their return ; that they did not bring back any sort of omniscience.[10]

This statement coincides with the constellation of ideas as presented in Jainism—that there is a moment of enlightenment, that it is characterized by "complete" knowledge and that contact with the world of matter involves the loss of this knowledge.

One may now present the account of such experiences recorded by Dr. Moody in fuller detail.

The experience has been compared, in various accounts, to a flash of universal insight, institutions of higher learning, a "school" and a "library". Everyone emphasizes, however, that the words they are using to describe this experience are at best only dim refelections of the reality they are trying to express. It is my own feeling that there may be one underlying state of consciousness which is to the root of all these different accounts.

One woman who had "died" gave the following report during an extended interview :

You mentioned earlier that you seemed to have a "vision of knowledge" if I could call it that. Could you tell me about it ?

This seems to have taken place after I had seen my life pass before me. It seemed that all of a sudden, all knowledge—of all that had started from the very beginning, that would go on without end—that for a second I knew all the secrets of all ages, all the meaning of the universe, the stars, the moon—of everything. But after I chose to return, this knowledge escaped, and I can't remember any of it. It seems that when I made the decision (to return) I was told that I would not retain my knowledge. But I kept being called back by my children ... ..

This all-powerful knowledge opened before me. It seemed that I was being told that I was going to remain sick for quite a while and that I would have other close calls. And I did have several close calls after that. They said some of it would be to erase this all-knowing knowledge that I had picked up ... that I had been granted the universal

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10. It is noteworthy that *kevalajnana* has actually been translated as omniscience, see S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I (Cambridge University Press, 1957) p. 207.

secrets and that I would have to undergo time to forget that knowledge. But I do have the memory of once knowing everything, that it did happen, but that it was not a gift that I would keep if I returned. But I chose to return to my children . The memory of all these things that happened has remained clear, all except for that fleeting moment of knowledge. And that feeling of all knowledge disappeared when I returned to my body.

It sounds silly ! Well, it does when you say it out loud...or it does to me, because I've never been able to sit and talk to someone else about it.

I don't know how to explain it, but I know. . As the Bible says, "To you all things will be revealed". For a minute, there was no question that didn't have an answer. How long I knew it, I couldn't say. It wasn't in earthly time, anyway.

In what form did this knowledge seem to be presented to you ? Was it in words or pictures ?

It was in all forms of communication, sights, sounds, thoughts. It was any-and every-thing. It was as if there was nothing that wasn't known. All knowledge was there, not just of one field, but everything.[11]

The remark which Dr. Moody makes after presenting this case is of capital importance. He says :

There is one point which I would like to make here about this narrative. This woman plainly had the impression that part of the purpose of her lengthy recuperation was to make her forget almost all of the knowledge which has been revealed to her. This suggests that some mechanism was operative that had the function of blocking the knowledge acquired in this state of existence so that it could not be carried over into the physical state of being.[12]

[11] *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 12. Dr.Moody also compares this account with the story of Er told by Plato "in an admittedly metaphorical and poetic way" Er was a warrior who came back to life on the funeral pyre, after having been believed dead. Er is said to have seen many things in the afterlife, but he was told that he must return to physical life to tell others what death is like. Just before he returned he saw souls which were being prepared to be born into life :

Kevalajñāna and Thanatology

A closer study of evidence on the "vision of knowledge" provided by subjects who have had near death experiences suggests at least three major convergences between these accounts and the Jain concept of *kevalajñāna.*

(1) Dr. Moody was told by a young man during an interview :

Now, I was in a school ..and it was real. It was not imaginary.

If I were not absolutely sure, I would say, "Well, there is a possibility that I was in this place". But it *was* real. It was like a school, and there was no one there, and yet there were a lot of people there. Because if you looked around, you would see nothing...but if you paid attention, you would feel, sense, the presence of other beings around ..It's as if there were lessons coming at me and they would keep coming at me ..

That's interesting. Another man told me that he went into what he called "libraries" and "institutions of higher learning". Is that anything like what you're trying to tell me ?

Exactly ! You see, hearing what you say he said about it, it's like I know exactly what he means, that I know he's been through this same thing I have. And, yet ..the words I would use are different, because there really are no words ..I cannot describe it.

They all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion, through a terrible and stifling heat for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness, whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars. Er himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre

The basic theme being presented here, that before returning to life a certain kind of "forgetting" of knowledge one has in the eternal state must take place, is similar in the two cases (*op. cit.*, pp. 12-13).

It seems, however, that the two cases are not on all fours because whereas the first case dealt with timeless knowledge this case seems to deal with events of after-life.

> You could not compare it to anything here. The terms I'm using to describe it are so far from the thing, but it's the best I can do.. Because this is a place where the *place* is knowledge .. knowledge and information are readily available—all knowledge. You absorb knowledge .. You all of a sudden know the answers .. It's like you focus mentally on one place in that school and—zoom—knowledge flows by you from that place, automatically. It's just like you'd had about a dozen speed reading courses.

> And I know verbatim what this man is talking about, but, you see, I'm just putting the same consciousness into my own words, which are different..

> I go on seeking knowledge , "Seek and ye shall find". You can get the knowledge for yourself. But I *pray* for wisdom, wisdom more than all.

> A middle-aged lady described it in this way :

> There was a moment in this thing—well, there isn't any way to describe it—but it was like I knew all things . For a moment, there, it was like communication wasn't necessary. I thought whatever I wanted to know could be known [13]

These statements by the subject sound like an experiential account of what may have been philosophically described in the following manner:

> The *jīva's* relation to matter explains also the somewhat peculiar Jaina view of knowledge. Knowledge is not something that characterizes the *jīva*. It constitutes its very essence. The *jīva* can therefore know unaided everything directly and exactly as it is ; only there should be no impediment in its way External conditions, such as the organ of sight and the presence of light, are useful only indirectly and *jñāna* results automatically when the obstacles are removed through their aid. That the knowledge which a *jīva* actually has is fragmentary is due to the obscuration caused by *karma* which interferes with its power of perception. As some schools assume a principle of *avidyā* to explain empirical thought, the Jains invoke the help of *karma* to do so. This empirical thought is sometimes differentiated from the *jīva*,

[13] *Ibid*, pp 13-14.

but its identity with the latter is at the same time emphasized, so that the *jiva* and its several *jñānas* in this sense constitute a unity in difference.[14]

(2) The fact that these moments of "vision of knowledge" are associated with death experiences enables one to look at the Jain practice of *sallekhanā* or "voluntary self-starvation"[15] in a new light. Could it not be suggested that the Jain practice is an effort to achieve this "vision of knowledge" on a lasting basis through a controlled and regulated dying instead of the haphazard manner in which one usually takes leave of this world. It should be noted that *sallekhanā* is not suicide in the usual sense of the word. Rules for carrying it out are laid down and it is "allowed only to those ascetics who have acquired the highest degree of perfection".[16]

(3) According to the view usually met with, the liberated beings in Jainism are said to reside on a *slab* at the top of the universe. The evidence adduced by Dr. Moody suggests that this may be too gross a view of the matter. One is reminded here of the remark of one of his interviewees :"....this is a place where the *place* is knowledge".[17] If this is so, then the word *siddhaśilā*[18] the abode of the perfect ones must be understood figuratively and not literally.

There are, to be sure, some differences between the "vision of knowledge" as experienced by Dr. Moody's subjects and the Jain concept of *kevalajñāna*. For one "Only liberated souls have such knowledge".[19] For another such knowledge can be attained by the spiritually advanced Arhats even while alive.[20] However, these considerations seem to bear

[14] M. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

[15] R C. Zaehner, ed , *op. cit* , p. 261.

[16] Upendra Thakur, *A History of Suicide in India : An Introduction* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1963) pp 104-106

[17] Dr Raymond A Moody, Jr., *Reflections On Life After Life*, p. 14.

[18] See Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970 (first published 1971) p. 217.

[19] S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, *op. cit.*, p 77.

[20] M Hiriyanna, *op cit* , pp. 168-169 ; R. C. Zaehner, ed , *op. cit* , p 264 :
To achieve salvation the soul must become free from matter of all kinds, when it will rise to the top of the universe through its natural lightness, to dwell there for ever in bliss. The souls of great sages such as Mahavira achieve virtual salvation while still in the body ; they enjoy the bliss and omniscience of the fully emancipated soul, but enough residual *karma* still clings to them to hold them to the earth ; when this is exhausted by penance and fasting they die, and their naked souls rise immediately to the realm of ineffable peace above the highest of the heavens of the gods.

on perfected beings while the evidence presented by Dr. Moody relates to the experience of ordinary human beings who have had a glimpse of what that perfect vision of knowledge might be like. There is all the difference between having a glimpse of the view from the peak and living on the peak itself.

Conclusion

The evidence provided by subjects who have had near-death experiences of prolonged duration lends plausibility to the otherwise seemingly airy-fairy concept of *kevalajñāna* in Jainism.

Ahimsa as Reflected in the Mularadhana

B. K. KHADABADI

Religion has played a dominant role along the course of the history of mankind ; and in almost all known religions of the world, *ahimsā* has been given a place with varied limitations In India in 600 B C., Jainism and Buddhism stood up in protest to the Vedic religion mainly on the principle of *ahimsā*. In Buddhism the theory and practice of *ahimsā* had their own limited scope. But in Jainism *ahimsā* was made to hold the pivotal position in its entire ethical and metaphysical system. To repeat the words of Dr. Bool Chand · "The way in which the doctrine of *ahimsā* is made to pervade the whole code of conduct is peculiary Jain."[1]

Now it is essential to remember that the Jaina theory and practice of *ahimsā* are older than the Vedic religion. According to tradition the gospel of *ahimsā* was first preached by Rsabhadeva. But in c. 1500 B. C. Aristanemi,[2] the 22nd Tirthankara, a cousin of Krsna, at the sight of the cattle tied together for his own wedding feast exemplified the practice of *ahimsā* by renouncing the world instantly. Then Parsvanatha, the 23rd Tirthankara (c. 800 B.C.), systematized the Jaina Philosophy by placing before the world his *cāujjāmadhamma* where *ahimsā* had its first place, which later, was also maintained in Mahavira's elucidated system of the *pañcamahāvvaya* etc.

Then whatever Mahavira preached and taught regarding *ahimsā* came down through oral traditions and finally settled in the canonical texts. Now, here, I propose to present, with observations, the outstanding facets of *ahimsā* as reflected in the *Anuśiṣṭi Adhikāra* (the section on Religious Instruction) of the *Mūlārādhanā* of Sivarya, a highly esteemed

1 *Lord Mahavira*, Sanmati Series No. 2 Varanasi, 1948, p. 73.

2 Scholars have accepted the historicity of Aristanemi : If Krsna, the arch-figure in the Mahabharata War, is accepted as a historical person, his cousin is bound to be so.

Prakrit (Jaina Sauraseni) text of the pro-canon of the Digambaras belonging to c 1st century A.D.[3]

The *Mūlārādhanā* belongs to that age when the Digambara and Svetambara sects were not much different from one another. Moreover Sivarya tells us that the entire early canonical knowledge has been condensed in this work :

ārāhaṇāṇivaddham savvampi hu hodi sudaṇāṇam[4]

Hence the contents of the portion of *ahimsā* in this work are of considerable importance The context of this portion of the text is as follows :

The *Kṣapaka* or *Ārādhaka* is on the *samstara* (his bed for the great final vow, viz., *bhaktapratyākhyāna*) and is exerting himself in the various austerities like *kāyotsarga* (complete indifference to body), *anuprekṣās* (spiritual reflections) etc. which destroy the *karman* gradually. At this stage, the *Niryāpakācārya* (the Superintending Teacher), sitting by his side, slowly and effectively instructs[5] him in the manifold aspects of religious tenets and practices, so that he may develop disgust for worldly life and longing for salvation. This course of instruction, naturally, also contains the topic of the *pañcamahāvrata*; and the sub-topic of *ahimsā* is covered by some 47 *gāhās* · 776 to 822.

Amongst these 47 *gāhās* several[6] contain exposition of the following facets of *ahimsā* which, amidst others, are usually found as laid down or discussed in other canonical texts, exegetical works and also in *śrāvakācāras* (treatises on the householder's conduct) :

(i) Definition of *himsā*
(ii) Equality of all souls
(iii) Five-fold indulgence in *himsā* (*pañcapayogā*)
(iv) *Bhāvahimsā*

[3] For my study here, I have followed the Solapur edition, 1935.

[4] *Gaha*, 2163.

[5] (i) This is *Anusisti*—instruction This Section (XXXIII) contains *gahas* 720 to 1489

(ii) Dr A. N Upadhye remarks· "The Section on *Anusisti* is a fine didactic work by itself Thus for the Jaina monk its importance is very great and its study simply indispensable." Intro. to *Brhatkathakosa*, Singhi Jaina Series 17, Bombay 1943, p 52

[6] Nos. 776, 783, 794, 800, 801, 807, 808, 811, 816, 817, 818, etc.

(v) Consequences of committing *himsā*
(vi) Mathematical calculation of the 108 types of *himsā*
(vii) Importance of keeping away the passions
(viii) Role of *guptis* and *samitis* in the successful practice of *ahimsā*

Hence repetition and enumeration of these here would be neither necessary nor practicable. So I would pick up only the significant facets of *ahimsā* for our discussion here :

After duly defining *himsā*[7], the Acarya lays down the basic concept of *ahimsā* in Jainism :

jaha te ṇa piyam dukkham taheva tesim pi jāṇa jīvāṇam
evam ṇaccā appovamio jīvesu hohi sadā[8]

Just as you do not like pain, so also other beings dislike it. Knowing this, treat them ever as your own self (and abstain from causing any injury to them).

This *gāhā* reminds us the famous passage in the *Āyārāṅga Sutta* :[9]

savve pāṇā piyāuyā suha sāyā
dukkha padikūlā appiya vahā piya jīviṇo
jīviu kāmā savvesim jīviyam piyam.

All beings are fond of life, like pleasure, hate pain, shun destruction, like life, long to live. To all life is dear.[10]

Then we also remember a similar *gāhā* in the *Dasaveyāliya Sutta* :[11]

savve jīvā vi icchanti jīvium na marijjium
tamhā pāṇi-vaham ghoram nigganthā vajjayanti ṇam

All beings desire to live and not to be slain. Therefore, the Jaina monks avoid the horrible act of killing living beings.

[7] In *gaha* No. 776.

[8] No. 777.

[9] *Ayaro* II-3, 63-64 : Ed. Muni Sri Nathmalji, Jaina Svet. Terapanthi Mahasabha, Calcutta, 1967, p. 29.

[10] Hermann Jacobi's translation : *Jaina Sutras* (Part I), *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXII, Delhi, 1964, p. 19.

[11] *Dasaveyaliya Suttam*, Ch VI, gaha 11 : Ed. Prof N. V. Vaidya, Pune, 1937

An all sided consideration and scrutiny of this passage and these two *gāhās* would indicate us that the passage in the *Āyārāṅga Sutta* could be rather a direct and close echo of what Mahavira taught on the basic concept of *ahimsā* in his own simple, effective and inimitable way ; and the *gāhās* in the *Mūlārādhanā* and *Dasaveyāliya* could be an indirect and distant echoes of the same.

Then in another *gāhā*,[12] the Acarya holds out the greatness of *ahimsā* amongst other vows :

There is nothing smaller than the atom and larger than the sky. Similarly there is no vow which is greater than *ahimsā*. This same idea is elucidated in the very next *gāhā*[13] by comparing *ahimsā* with the loftiest Mount Meru.

Further, we find an exposition of *ahimsā* as an all comprising vow :

Just as the sky contains all the three worlds, and the earth holds all the oceans, similarly (the practice of) *ahimsā* comprises within it (the practice of) all the vows—*vratas*, *śīlas* and *guṇas*.[14]

Then in the next two *gāhās*,[15] the Acarya describes, in the same figurative language and style, the pivotal position of *ahimsā* in the entire scheme of the ascetic vows This description can be summerised as follows :

Ahimsā is the hub of the wheel of religion that holds together the spokes of *śīla* which as well support the outer ring (the ascetic conduct). Moreover the *śīlas* play a protective role towards the vow of *ahimsā* like the hedge towards crop.

Further, it is explained[16] that by practising *ahimsā*, the first vow,

[12] No 784.

[13] No. 785.

[14] (i) No 786

(ii) Somehow the Vijayodaya Commentary of Aparajita Suri does not say anything more about this *gaha*. But it is curious to know that the *Mulacara* (M. D. J *Series* 23, Bombay, V.S. 1980), in its *Silagunaprasturadhikara* states, with calculation, that there are in all *attharahasatisahassaim* 18,000 protective rules of conduct (*gaha* 2) and 84,000,00 *gunas*—ascetic virtues (*gaha* 8 and onwards). All this gives us an idea of the scientific working-out of the Jaina way of *ahimsa* in the conduct of the monk.

[15] Nos. 787-788.

[16] No. 791

the other four vows can also be successfully observed. At this context, I remember R. William's observation on Amrtacandra, author of the *Purušārtha-siddhyupāya* : Amrtacandra explains "every other *vrata* is but a restatement in different terms of the content of the first".[17] Hence we can say that *ahimsā* also acts as a Master Key for other vows to be operated for salvation.

At one spot[18] the Acarya, in his own sarcastic style, brings out the universal range and positive nature of *ahimsā* by contrasting it with a Brahmanic religious dictum :

gobambhaṇīthivadhamettimiyartti jadi have paramadhammo
paramo dhammo kiha so ṇa hoi jā savva bhūda dayā

If abstention from killing merely the cow, the Brahmin and the woman could make one religion supreme, why could not another religion, with compassion unto all beings, be accepted as supreme ?

And lastly, we can not afford to ignore Sivarya's exemplification[19] of social equality and corrigible opportunity for any violent culprit, admitted by the practice of *ahimsā* in Jainism, through an illustration of the story of a *cāṇḍāla*, who was thrown in the Simsumara region of hell, but who, later, was worshipped by gods for observing the vow of *ahimsā* for a short time.

In conclusion, we can note : This portion of the text in the *Mūlārādhanā* presents a panoramic view of the various facets of the theory and practice of *ahimsā* as a great vow. One of the *gāhās*[20] contains the basic concept of *ahimsā* in Jainism—almost an indirect and distant echo of Lord Mahavira's words on *ahimsā*. By liberally using similies, illustrations etc., rather than often advancing logical arguments, the author, who is the master of canonical knowledge as well as a skilled teacher, imprints on our mind the great, all comprising, all pervading, pivotal, universal and positive nature of *ahimsā* in the system of the ascetic (and also partly applicable to the lay) conduct. Hence there is no wonder if some of the above cited *gāhās* prominently appear under the topic of *ahimsā* in the recent learned compilations like the *Jinavāṇī*[21] and encyclopaedic works like the *Jainendra Siddhānta Koša*.[22]

[17] *Jaina Yoga*, London, 1963, p. 64
[18] No 792
[19] No 822.
[20] No. 777.
[21] Ed. Dr. H L Jain, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, 1975.
[22] Part I, Ed. Jinendra Varni, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, 1970.

The Doctrine of Karma in Jainism

Y. KRISHAN

The Jainas postulated a doctrine of *karma* which is unique in many respects, especially in regard to its genesis. But it is more or less similar to the classical doctrine of *karma* in its operation.

Nature of Karma and its Genesis

According to the Jainas, *karman* is a form of matter, *pudgala*, and atomic in its nature. It has the property of downward gravity, *adho-gurutva*. The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*[1] 33 17-18 states that "the number of atoms of every *karman* is infinite" and is to be found in all the six directions of space. It is this atomic matter which binds all souls. In contradistinction to *karman*, soul has the property of upward movement, *ūrdhagurutva*.[2]

In the same *Sūtra* 33 1-15, the *karman* are said to be of eight kinds :

(i) *jñānāvaraṇīya*, those which act as an obstruction to right knowledge.

(ii) *darśanāvaranīya*, those which act as an obstruction to right faith.

(iii) *mohanīya*, those which cause delusion.

(iv) *vedanīya*, those which lead to experience of pain or pleasure.

(v) *āyuh karman*, those which determine the *gati* or the form of existence—in hell, as brute creation, as human being or as god.

(vi) *nāma*, those which determine the individuality, the specific form of existence, which distinguishes one being from another of the same specie.

[1] Hermann Jacobi (tr), *Jaina Sutras, S.B.E* XLV pt. II, Delhi, 1964.

[2] Jacobi, *Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics*, Edinburgh 1954, Vol. IV, 484 b

(vii) *gotra*, those which determine the social status.

(viii) *antarāya*, those which prevent a person from engaging in a beneficial activity of giving gifts, *dāna*, realising the full benefit (*lābha*) of any activity and obtaining therefrom optimum experience, *upabhoga*, and energy, *vīrya*.

The first three types of *karmas*, *jñānvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇīya* and *mohanīya*, are called *ghātī* or destructive *karmas*. They are so called because they obstruct knowledge and faith and cause delusion and thereby subvert the true nature of the soul which is illumination and perfect knowledge.

The *karman* produces *leśyās* (*Uttarādhyayana*, 34.1) ; these *leśyās* create colour, taste, smell, sense of touch. The *leśyās* determine a man's character or personality e.g. black *leśyā* make a person wicked, violent, cruel whereas white *leśyā* makes a man free from passion, calm with his senses under control, etc.

The role of *leśyās* has been defined in the *Jīvakāṇḍa* of *Gommatasāra*[3] 489 :

limpai appīkīrai edīe ṇiya apuṇṇapuṇṇam ca
jīvetti hod lessā lessāguṇajāṇayakkhādā.

That whereby the soul is tinted, identified with merit and demerit (*puṇya* and *pāpa*) is called *leśyā* ; so it is taught by those who know the qualities of *leśyās*.

The *karman* operates through body, speech and mind which are the creations of matter. According to the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*[4] 5.19 of Umasvami

[3] Quoted in J L. Jaini's *Outlines of Jainism*, London, 1966, p 104. See also A. N Upadhye & K C Shastri (ed & tr) *Gommatsara*, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, 1978. Madhavacarya's *Sarvadarsanasamgraha* in *Arhatdarsanam* 15.21 classifies the *karmas as subha* and *asubha*.

[4] J. L. Jaini (ed & tr), *Tattvartha-sutra of Umasvami*, Delhi, 1951 See also S. Radhakrishnan & C. A. Moore : *A Source Book in Indian Philospohy*, Princeton, 1967. *Pancastikaya* 82 is very specific about the material character of the mind . *uvabhojjamidiehi ya indiyakaya mano ya kammani jam havedi muttamanam tam savvam puggalam jana*. Things enjoyable by the senses, the five senses themselves, the bodies, the mind, the *karmas* and other material objects —all this known as matter (*pudgala*). Quoted in J. L. Jaini's *Outlines of Jainism*, London, 1916, p. 84. See also A. Chakravarti Nayanar (ed & tr), *Pancastikayasara*, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, 1975.

"The function of matter is to form the basis of bodies, speech, mind and breath."

Yoga or vibrations (*parispanda*) is the activity of body, speech and mind. *Yoga* causes the inflow of karmic matter into the soul (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 6. 1-2). Thus the activities of the body, speech and mind cause production of *yoga* (vibrations) in the *jīva* or soul and thereby endows the soul with the capacity to attract matter.[5]

Pari passu, *mohanīya* (delusion causing) *karman* produces *kaṣāyas*, passions, in the soul : anger, pride, deceit and greed (*Tattvārtha*, 8.9). These passions endow the soul with the capacity to absorb the *karman* matter attracted through *yoga* or vibrations (*Tattvārtha*, 9 2). This leads to bondage (*bandha*) of the soul to matter.

Thus the capacity of the soul to attract (*yoga*) matter and to absorb or assimilate it (*kaṣāya*) and of the *karman* to bind (*bandha*) the soul facilitate the inflow, *āśrava*, of *karman-pudgala*, karmic matter into the soul as a result of mundane activities.

The volume of the inflow (*āśrava*) of karmic matter depends upon the intensity of desires, intention, the power and position of an individual acting knowingly and of free will or out of compulsion (*Tattvārtha*, 6.6) : *tivra-manda-jñāta-ajñāta-bhāva-adhikaraṇa-vīrya viśeṣabhyas*

The *karman* matter, in conjunction with the soul, forms *karman śarīra*, karmic body which transmigrates at death and is reborn in different forms of life depending upon its *karmas*.

Freedom from bondage of *karmas* (*akarmatā*) is attained by (a) preventing accumulation of *karmas* by *saṃvara*, stopping the inflow (*āśrava*) of *karman* and (b) by *nirjarā* purging or liquidating the existing stock of *karman*

Saṃvara or stoppage of the production of new *karmas* is achieved by an individual by following the *dharma* taught by the Tirthankaras, by destroying passions, by following the prescribed discipline (*vinaya*), by self-denial, by confessing one's sins, by repentence, by austerities

[5] Kundakunda in his *Pravacanasara* 2.77 states · "The molecules capable of becoming *karmas*, coming into contact with the (impassioned) conditions or transformation of the soul, are developed into *karmas* and not that they are so transformed by the soul." A. N. Upadhye (ed & tr), *Pravacanasara*, Agas, 1964.

(*Uttarādhyayana* 29). As Madhavacarya, (*Ibid.*, 15.23) says *āśrava bhavahetuh syātsaṁvaro mokṣakāraṇam* : *āśravas* are the cause of birth in this world, *saṁvara* is the cause of liberation.

Nirjarā or liquidation of the already accumulated *karmas* is achieved through *prāyascitta* (expiation) (*Uttarādhyayana* 29.12(16), austerities (*Uttarādhyayna* 29.27 and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.2.15), by turning away from the world (*Uttarādhyayana*, 29.32), by renouncing activity, he obtains inactivity, by ceasing to act he acquires no new *karman* and destroys the *karman* he had acquired before. (*Uttarādhyayana* 29.37). Again ". .a man destroys by austerities or penance the bad *karman* which he had acquired by love and hatred"(*Uttarādhyayana*, 30.1). Madhavacarya(*Ibid.*, 15.23) defines *nirjarā* thus : *arjitasya karmaṇastapah prabhṛtibhinirjaraṇam nirjarākhyam tatvam* : *nirjarā* is that element which destroys the accumulated *karmas* through austerities. He adds that long accumulated *kārmic* matter (*cirakāla pravṛttakāṣaya*) is destroyed through experiencing the results (*sukha*, *dukkha*) and through the body (*deha*) (by subjecting it to mortification). He also classifies *nirjarā* into two categories : *yathākāla* and *aupakramika* : the first type of *nirjarā* is the result of exhaustion of *karmas* though experiencing their results (*karma phala pradatvenābhimatam*) ; the second type of *nirjarā* is achieved through austerities (*tapobala*) practised by one's own volition (*svakāmanā va*).

These austerities are of two kinds : external and internal. External austerities are : *anaśana*, fasting, *kāyakleśa*, mortification of the body such as pulling out the hair of the head *keśa luñcana*,[6] abstinence etc. (*Uttarādhyayana*, 30.8)

Internal austerities are : *prāyaścitta* or expiation of sins, *dhyāna* (meditation), *svādhyāya* (study of scriptures) etc. (*Uttarādhyayana*, 30.30).

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.2.15 says *kamam khavai tavassi mahān, karma* decreases through austerities. In the preceding *sūtra* 2.2.14 *tapas* is defined as fasting etc.

Since *karmas* can be purged, the Jainas recognise that *karmas* fall off or are got rid of in two ways : (a) *svavipāka* on their maturing themselves, that is after experiencing the consequences of *karmas*, (b) *avipāka*, before maturing in natural course with efflux of time. These are *karmas*

[6] Madhavacarya (*Ibid.*, 15.23) defines *tapa* as *kesolluncanadhikam tapah* pulling out of hair from the head etc.

which are exhausted or annihilated before their due time, that is prematurely by purificatory practices. As the *Tattvārtha*, 10.2 emphasises, release from *karmas* is obtained through the absence of *bandha* (*bandhahetu abhāva*) and *nirjarā*.

Karma as a Causative Force

The Jaina *Aṅgas*, sacred texts, treat *karma* as the motive force of the cycle of existence.

The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* 3.3-4 observes as under :

egayā devaloesu, naryesu vi egaya
egayā asuram kāyam, ahākammehim gacchaī

The *jīva* or soul sometimes is born in *devaloka* (the world of gods), sometimes in hell. Sometimes it acquires the body of an *asura*, all this happens due to *karmas*.
Again, *egayā*.. ....
tao kiḍapayango ya tata kunthu pīvīliyā

(This *jīva* sometimes takes birth) as a worm, as an insect, as an ant.

Again the *Uttarādhyayana*, 32.7 states "*kammam ca jāimaraṇassa mūlam* : *Karma* is the root of birth and death. In *Uttarādhyayana*, 33.1 it is said : *jehi baddho ayam jīvo samsāre parivattae*.

The souls bound by *karman* go round and round in the cycle of existence (see also *Uttarādhyayana*, 10.15)

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,[7] 1.2.3.18 observes :
sarve sayakamma kappiyā avivattena duheṇa pānine
hindati bhavāulā saddhā jāi-jarā maraṇehi abhiddutā

All living beings owe their present form of existence to their own *karman* ; timid, wicked, suffering latent misery, they err about (in the circle of births) subject to birth, old age and death.

Pañcāstikāya[8] 128 sums up the position in the following verse :

[7] Ghasilal (ed & tr), *Sutrakrtanga Sutram*, Rajkot, 1969, in Hindi & Gujarati. Jacobi (tr), *Jaina Sutras*.
[8] Quoted in J. L. Jaini's *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 103.

jo khalu samsarattho jīvo tato du hode pariṇamoe
pariṇāmādo kammam kammado bodi gadisu gadi

Verily the soul which is in *samsāra* (cycle of existence) has impure evolution. From evolution comes *karma* and from *karma* the state of existence (*gati*).

The *Tattvārtha* 2.25 observes : *vigrahagatau karma yogah:* embodiment (of souls) is caused by vibrations produced by *karmas*. So Pujyapada in his commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* on the above *sūtra* observes: *sarva śarīra prarohaṇabija bhūtam kārmaṇam śarīram karma iti ucyate*. the root cause of origination of all bodies is *kārman* body ; *karmaṇa krto yogah karma yogo vigrahagatau : karma* produces vibrations which in turn lead to embodiment of *jīvas*.

Jinasena in his *Adipurāṇa* IV. 35 observes :
nirmāna karmanirmātr kausalapadi todayam
aṅgopāṅgadivaicitryamanginām sangiravahe

The peculiarities that are to be seen in the limbs (principal and minor) of the creation in this universe, that is the diversity that we see in the creation, is all caused by the efficiency of *karmas*.

In *Adipurāṇa* IV. 36 Jinasena reiterates :
tadetatkarma vaicitryayad bhavannānātmakam jagati
viśvakarmāṇāmātmānam sādhyetkarma saritham

The diversity in this world is the product of the unique nature of *karmas*. It is evident that the world is the product of *karmas* done by an *ātmā* and the *karmas* have an essential *associative* role. Again *Adipurāṇa* IV. 37 equates *karma* with the creator :

vidhih sraṣṭā vidhāṭā ca daivam karma purākṛtam
iśvarsceti paryāya vijyayāh karmavedhasah

Law, Creator, Dispenser, Destiny, previous *karmas* and the Lord are different names of *karma*.

The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* 8.9.9 links specific states of existence to specific *karmas*. Violent deeds, killing of creatures having five sense organs, eating fish etc. lead to birth in hell ; deception, fraud, speaking falsehood lead to birth in the animal and vegetable world ; kindness, compassion, humble character lead to birth as a human being ; austerities, observance of vows etc. lead to birth in heaven.

Karma as a Law of Retributive Justice and Personal Responsibility

Sūtrakṛtāṅga I.1.1.5 observes :
vittam soyariyā ceva savvamevam na tānai
sankhāe jīvivam ceva kammuṇā u tiuttai

Wealth, and brothers and sisters, all these are unable to protect a person. Knowing that there is no protection (against *karma*) in life, one gets rid of *karma*. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.1.41 emphasises that "the bonds of relationship are not able to help.." Again the same *Sūtra* 1.1.10.2 avers—

ege kicca sayam payam, tivam dukkham niyacchai

One who himself does an evil deed, suffers therefor quickly.

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.2.2 attacks the teaching of the Niyativadins that one's suffering is not due to one's actions (*na te syam kadam dukkham*) but due to fate.

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.12.1.4 says :
sayameva kadehim ghāhanti no tassa muccejja aputthayam

(Persons) go round (in the cycle of existence) for the acts done by themselves ; without experiencing their results, there is no release

Again *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* I 2.3.17 states :
egassa gai ya āgai biumantā saraṇam na mannai

A being alone is born and reborn, as according to enlightened persons there is no refuge (or escape from *karma*) for such a person

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.1.39 makes it clear that even the most intimate relations mother, father, brother, sister, wife and children, cannot share the suffering that may befall a person and adds in *Sūtra* 1.2.1.40.

....One man cannot take upon himself the pains of another ; one man cannot experience what another has done (re · his *karman*).

The *Uttarādhyayana* maintains the same position. In the *Uttarādhyayana*, 4.3 it is said : *evam payā pecca iham ca loe, kadāṇa kaman na mokkha athi* : ". people in this life and the next cannot escape the effect of their own actions."

The *Uttarādhyayana*, 4.4 reiterates that *kammasa te tassa u veyakale na bandhava bandhavayam uventi* : one's relations cannot share the fruits of a person's actions when they mature. In the same *Sūtra* 13.29 it is emphasised :

na tassa dukkham vibhayanti naio
na mittavagga no suva na bandhava
ikko sayam paccami hoi dukkham
kartārame vam anujai kammam

Neither his kinsmen, nor his sons, nor his relations will share his suffering , he has alone to bear it ; for the *karman* follows the doer.

The *Uttarādhyayana* 8.20 states that . .all beings will reap the fruit of their actions.

In the same *Sūtra* 13 10 it is asserted · *kaḍāna kamman mokkho na athi* : There is no escape from the effect of one's *karmas*.

Haribhadra Suri sums up pithily in the *Saḍdarśana-samuccaya*[9] 48 : *śubhāśubha karmakartā bhoktā karma phalasya ca*, the doer of good and evil deeds is also the enjoyer of the fruits of those deeds.

We conclude this topic with a verse from *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā*[10] 76.
ikko sancadi puṅam ikko bhunjede vivihasura sokkham
ikko kavedi kammam ikko vi ya pavae mokkham.

Alone he (a person) accumulates merit ; alone he enjoys happiness in heaven : alone he destroys *karma* ; alone he attains *mokṣa* (liberation).

Karma and Human Inequalities

Jainism explains the phenomenon of inequality among human beings as a product of good and evil *karma*. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.1.13 states :

Here in the east, west, north and south many men have been born according to their merits, as inhabitants of this world, viz. some as Āryas,

[9] M. K Jain (ed & tr), *Saddarsana-samuccaya*, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, 1970.

[10] Quoted by J. L. Jaini: *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 80. Mallisena in *Syadvadamanjari* tr. by F. W. Thomas in his commentary on stanza XVIII states: *ityekanavate kalpe saktya me puruso hatah tena karma vipakenc pade viddhosmi bhiksavah* : In the ninety first aeon from this a person was slain by my power. Through that maturation of *karma* I have been wounded in the foot, O *bhiksus*.

some as non-Āryas, some in noble families, some in low families, some as big men, some as small men, some of good complexion, some as handsome, some as ugly men. And of these men, one man is king....".

In fact the caste system in Indian society is specifically explained on the basis of *karma*.

The *Uttarādhyayana* 3.4 avers :
egacā khattio hoi, tao caṇḍāla bukkaso

The *jiva* sometimes is born as a *kṣatriya*, as a *candāla*, or in a mixed caste.

The *Uttarādhyayana* 13 19 points out that a person of the lowest caste, *svapāka* in his earlier life, had improved his caste position in the present incarnation by accumulating good *karmas*, *parekaḍai kamāi*.

Role of Volition or Intention in Jaina Doctrine of Karma

In Jainism intent is not an essential pre-condition of sin or wrong conduct. Evil intent forms only one of the modes of committing sin. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1 1.2 29 says : *manasā je paussanti puttam tesi na vijjai* · a man who bears ill-will, his mind is not pure. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.1.1.3 it is said "If a man kills living beings or causes other men to kill them, or consents to their killing them, his iniquity will go on increasing." The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.2.4-23 specifies thirteen kinds of sinful actions, of these, sins committed for one's selfish interests, lying, stealing, deception, greediness, taking revenge are all acts rooted in the mind and lead to *karman*. But sins done through accident and error of sight (leading to error of fact) and not involving the mind actively, also attract bad *karman*. The text cited above states : "We now treat of the fourth kind of committing sins, called accidental". Intending to kill a deer, a person actually kills another bird or animal. Here instead of one (being) he hurts another, (therefore he is called) an accidental killer. Or while cutting weed grasses, a man cuts rice plant. "Here instead of one (plant) he hurts another, (therefore he is called) an accidental killer. Thereby the bad *karman* accrues to him".

In the fifth kind of sins, a person mistaking a friend for an enemy through error of sight, kills the friend by mistake. Likewise, a person kills someone mistaking him for a robber. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.1.2.26-29 attacks the belief of other schools that he who commits violence without knowledge (*abuho jam hisai*) suffers from that *karma* only nominally

and that such an evil deed does not manifest itself or ripen : it calls such action (done in ignorance) as one of the three evil fetters (*āyāṇā*). Again in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.4.1 it is said that "though a fool does not consider (that even if he is not conscious of) the operations of his mind, speech and body ..still he commits sins". This is asserted in the face of the contrary view said to have been held by an opponent of Mahavira viz. that "there can be no sin, if (the perpetrator of an action) does not possess sinful thoughts, speech and functions of the body...if he does not consider the operations of mind, speech and body..." (*Ibid.*, 2.4.2). Mahavira repeats to his opponent "..there is sin, though (the perpetrator of the action) does not possess sinful thoughts"...(*Ibid.*, 2.4.3).

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*[11] 2.6.26-27 sets out with disapproval the Buddhist view that a person cannot be guilty of murder if he has committed it as a result of mistake of fact. The *Sūtra* says : "If (a savage) thrusts a spit through the side of a granary, mistaking it for a man ; or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it, he will be guilty of murder" according to the view of the Buddhists. Again according to the Buddhists "If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, or a baby mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder....". Ardraka, the Jaina sage comments "well-controlled men cannot accept (your denial of) guilt incurred by (unintentionally) doing harm to living beings".

The absence of evil intent, however, does not absolve a person of guilt ; only its presence is an aggravating factor. Intent is a function of *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (hatred) and is quality of mental action (*mānasika karma*) as distinct from actions of body (*kāya*) and speech (*vāk*). Intent increases the *yoga* or vibrations of the soul and therefore the latter attracts and absorbes more *karma*. Thus intent is only one factor and not the only factor in performance of *karmas*.

This is in conformity with the Jaina cosmological concepts. The one sensed (*ekendriya*), two sensed (*dvindriya*) and three sensed (*trindriya*) beings or *jīvas* have only the sense of touch, touch and smell, touch, smell and taste. They are, therefore, *bhogis*, experiencers only. The four sensed (*caturendriya*) and five sensed (*pañcendriya*) beings are both *bhogis* and *kāmis* (actuated by desire) as they possess, in addition to the three senses, either the faculty of hearing or and of seeing. [12] Again some of the five sensed *jīvas* or beings are endowed with mind *sama-*

[11] Jacobi, *Jaina Sutras*.
[12] *Bhagavati Sutra*, 3.7.7.

naṣkah and hence are rational *sanjñin*, that is, possess reasoning faculty; others do not have the capacity for reasoning (*asanjñin*).[13] The generation and accumulation (*upacaya*) of *karmas* takes place through functioning of body, speech and mind (*kāya prayoga*, *vacana prayoga* and *manah prayoga*).[14] Thus accumulation (*upacaya*) of *karmas* takes place as a result of instinctive and autonomic activities and volitional actions of all beings or *jīvas*—from *ekendriyas* (one sensed) upwards ; their ethical[15] quality and duration, that is the period in which they would manifest their potential, depend on the intent. Thus purely *bhoga karmas* are of severely limited duration and amoral ; the mental *karmas* may have a long duration and may be classified as good or evil depending upon the intent of the *sanjñin*.

Kundakunda in *Samayasāra*[16] 175-77 stresses that it is the *bhāvas* (mental states like *rāga*—attachment, *dveṣa*—hatred etc.) that make the latent *karma bandhas* active or operative (175) ; the *karmas* cannot bind in the absence of mental inflows : *āśrava bhāva abhāve na pratyayā bandhakā bhanitah* (176) and *āśrava bhāvena vinā hetavo na pratyayā bhavanti* (177).

More positively he asserts in *Samayasāra* 262, 263 that the will to kill, to steal, to be unchaste, and to acquire property, whether these offences are actually committed or not, lead to bondage of evil *karmas*.

Thus, though the Jaina doctrine of *karma* is substantially different from that of the Buddhists, yet it would appear that, in the matter of ethics, *puṇya* or *sukṛta* (good actions) and *pāpa* or *duṣkṛta* (evil actions), there is essential similarity.

It would be seen that Jainas propounded a doctrine of *karma* which is unique in many respects :

(i) *Karman* is extremely fine subtle matter. *Karmas* are born of matter *pudgala*, *karman's* association with the *jīva* or soul.

[13] *Tattvartha Sutra*, 1.24 & 2.11 and Pujyapada's commentary *Sarvarthasiddhi* (ed & tr) by Phool Chandra Jain, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kashi, 1955.

[14] *Bhagavati Sutra*, 2.6.3 : *kayavan manah karma yogah*, *Sarvarthasiddhi* 6.2.1.

[15] Jainism considers all *karmas* as evil, a defiling category Therefore the distinction between good and evil is only empirical.

[16] The *Samayasara* of Kundakunda with commentary of Amritchandra ed. & tr. by A. Chakravarti, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kashi, 1950.

(ii) Mind is a material entity, a product of *karman*. Mind is a material attribute only of certain forms of creation. As *Tattvārtha* 2.11. points out, "Worldly selves are (of two kinds) with mind and without mind".

(iii) The psychic states, as we usually understand them, such as anger, greed, pride etc., however intangible and subtle, are material in origin, born of matter. Hence the *kārmaṇa pudgala* has the property of movement (inflow) and accumulation ; it is equally liable to be drained out or discharged (*nirjarā*).

(iv) The discharge or accumulated *karman* is brought about, through *prāyaścitta* (expiation) and *tapas* (austerities), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *svādhyāya* (study of sacred scriptures). It is the concept of *nirjarā* which justifies external penance in the form of *sallekhanā*, religious suicide.

(v) It is a consequence of the material character of the *karmas* that intent is not the only ingredient in committing a lapse or offence; the Jainas recognise unintentional lapses. This also made the law of *karma* comparatively inflexible and partially mechanical.

(vi) Again the belief of the Jainas that *karmas* can be exhausted through physical austerities explains the severely ascetic practices of the Jainas and accounts for the survival of *tapasyā* as an important element in Indian culture.[17]

(vii) The doctrine that *tapa* could exhaust one's evil deeds became the source of *prāyaścitta* in Hinduism and Hindu law. *Prāyaścitta* in the life of laymen came to be the counterpart of *tapas* in the life of *Yatis* or Jaina ascetics

(viii) The belief that *tapa* could expiate evil *karma* ensured that the doctrine of *karma* did not promote fatalism amongst its believers.

[17] Y. Krishan: "The Unique Jaina Doctrine of *Karma* & Its Contribution", *Studies in Indian Philosophy, Shuklalji Commemoration Volume*, Ahmedabad, 1981.

A Note on a Unique Jaina Relief from Sulgi

PRATIP KUMAR MITRA

During the course of his official duties in Bankura district (West Bengal) Sri J. N. Banerjee,[1] of the West Bengal Information Service, discovered in the year 1979 some interesting antiquities[2] around the mouzas of Harmasra, Sulgi, Brahmandiha, Lodda, etc, under the Taldangra Police Station of the district. These included an exquisite little sculpture relief of a Jina with his *śāsanadevī* (Frontispiece) reportedly collected from the bank of Silavati river in the Sulgi[3] mouza. The image, considerably worn out and effaced, measures 15.4 cm × 7.7 cm × 1 5 cm. Worked in bold relief on a rectangular slab of white-spotted red sandstone, the stele reveals a Tirthankara seated in *padmāsana* in *dhyāna-mudrā* beneath a *chatra* held on either side by a flying couple. The Jina is flanked by two standing figures, apparently, attendants holding *caurīs* but presently abraded beyond recognition. A circular halo at his back, and sharp rays that radiate from his shoulders define the glory of the Jina The rigidity and discipline of the manner of his sitting in *padmāsana* makes a contrast to the very plasticity of the supple form of the female divinity curved below The bejewelled *śāsanadevī* is seated in *mahārājalīlāsana*

[1] Sri J. N Banerjee is presently the District Information Officer, Burdwan district under the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of West Bengal. He collected this interesting relief while he was posted as District Information Officer, Bankura district The author is beholden to Sri Banerjee for kindly permitting to examine and publish the object under discussion.

[2] Among these are a hoard of *Puri-Kushana* coins, two fragmentary Jaina sculptures, besides potteries. For details see, Jitendranath Bandyopadhyay, 'Sulgir Puratattva' (in Bengali), *Paschim Banga*, 4 January, 1980, pp. 535-538.

[3] Sulgi mouza (J. L. No. 24) is situated on the bank of Silavati river under the Taldangra Police Station of Bankura district. The mouza is uninhabited and covers an area of 370.10 acres, the major portion of which comprises of barren land. The present author is informed by Sri Banerjee of the existence of a mound of about 20 ft. in height from the river level in this mouza. For further details of location and findspot of the object under discussion, see, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-538.

on a couchant lion under a stylized tree which forms an arch over her head. She lends support to a child seated on her left lap with her left hand, while in her right she holds an indistinct object, possibly a fruit. A miniature female figure holding and caressing another child is shown as seated on her right side. The features of the *śāsanadevī* as well as that of the attendant at her side are all badly effaced.

The lion mount, appearence of a child in her lap, and another with her attendant, argues well for the identification of the *śāsanadevī* as Ambika the *yakṣī* of the twentysecond Tirthankara Neminatha (Aristanemi). Of her chief marks of identification[4] the mango-tree or a bunch of mangoes could not be located with any certainty due to the worn out condition of the lower register of the stele. The stylized tree above the *śāsanadevī* may however be explained as an indication of a mango-tree ladden with fruits, which probably it is but for its eroded state of preservation Similarly, the object held by the *yakṣī* in her right hand could well have been a mango. Another interesting feature of the relief is the spacing of the Jina and his *śāsanadevī* in almost equal size contrary to the prevalent practices.

The sense of volume and depth as conveyed by the figures contains the lingering grace and charm of the late Gupta art. This will attribute the stele to a date of about 8th-9th century A.D. on stylistic grounds.

In view of the discovery of this important Jaina relief the areas around Sulgi mouza, under the Taldangra P. S. of Bankura[5] district, will merit a thorough exploration in order to reveal the vestiges of possible Jaina shrine or settlement.

[4] *Cf.*, *Pratisthasaroddhara*, 176, quoted by Jyotindra Jain and Eberhard Fischer in their *Jaina Iconography*, Part Two, Leiden, 1978, p. 24, and the discussion following. See also, B. C. Bhattacharya, *The Jaina Iconography*, Delhi, 1974, pp. 103-104; and U. P. Shah, "Iconography of the Jaina Goddess Ambika", *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Bombay, 1940, pp. 147-169.

[5] For Jaina antiquities discovered in Bankura district, see among others, Debala Mitra, "Some Jaina Antiquities from Bankura, West Bengal", *Journal of the Asiatic Society, Letters*, Vol. xxiv, No 2, Calcutta, 1958, pp.131-134, pls. I to X ; Amiya Kumar Bandyopadhyay, *Bankura Jelar Purakirti* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1975

Healer of the Rift of Grieving

Leona Smith Kremser

O rift of grieving
That a soul its earth-body is leaving . . .

Monsoon of tears then, sacrifice of gold
Stay not the crossing at the grey threshold.
In vain the dear name is called by the mourner,
The part that would heed is departing forever.
In truth, the soul is leaving behind the body
As evidence that worldly existence is a duality
—Soul and body in combination
From the beginningless time of transmigration.

Yet the mourner in a cold fever of grief
Curses all things yet living, even marigold leaf.
And laments in a wailing litany,
"My Beloved, how can ye forsake me ?"
Memories take root in the monsoon of tears,
Crowding like thorn-tree barriers,
For the tear-blinded eye no further can see
Than the everyday viewpoint of reality
—The half of truth that truly exists
In the earth-body wherein the soul manifests

Slowly, the mourner ponders the unending why
All living things are doomed to die,
Apparently cruel and useless fact
That the writ of life is a death pact.
"My beloved's today shall be my tomorrow,
Blowing, the ashes of our marigolds of sorrow."
Out of the space of wasted sighs,
So slowly, a great notion begins to rise
—Notion that securely persists
That beyond the half, the whole of truth exists.

Now, by faith carried over from past lives
In rewarding proof that right faith survives,
The mourner is led on a pilgrimage
To the nearby shrine of a Jaina image.
"A bow to Ye, Ye Soul Wayshower.
By grace, show ye the soul to this humble mourner."
Upturned palms of devotion,
Stern hours of Jaina study and non-violent dedication
—Fruit thereof, the mourner's vision of blissful infinity
That is the pure viewpoint of soul identity.

Soul identity, by way of the blessed benefaction
Of the truth of the righteous Jaina religion,
Truth in the essence of all spiritual wisdom
That body is bondage and soul is freedom.
Ignorant soul, in material infatuation,
By free choice had quit its immaterial perfection.
Yet by free choice of non-violence, restraint and penance
The soul may return to its primal radiance
—The pure, individual and eternal identity
That is the Jaina soul reality.

Good *karma* bears fruit, the mourner is free
From the fragmented half-truth that life is misery,
For now the mourner beholds the goal
Of reunion with the self's own blissful soul.
"My Beloved, let us dearly wish
That our coming lives shall dearly cherish
The truth and harmlessness of the Jaina religion
That shall lead us from body bondage to soul freedom."
. . . O praise the Faith, that as a soul its earth-body is leaving
Right Faith in the Jaina religion heals the rift of grieving.

BOOK REVIEW

Translation of Canonical Texts from Prakrit into English by Prof. K. C. Lalwani :

1. DASAVAIKALIKA SUTRA by Arya Sayyambhava, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973. Pages xx +268. Price Rs. 30.00.
2. KALPA SUTRA by Bhadrabahu Svami, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979. Pages xix+207. Price Rs. 55.00.
3. BHAGAVATI SUTRA by Sudharma Svami, Vol. I (*Satakas* 1-2), Jain Bhawan, Calcutta, 1973. Pages xv+334. Price Rs. 40.00.
4. BHAGAVATI SUTRA by Sudharma Svami, Vol. II (*Satakas* 3-6), Jain Bhawan, Calcutta, 1974. Pages xv+403. Price Rs. 40.00.
5. BHAGAVATI SUTRA by Sudharma Svami, Vol. III (*Satakas* 7-8), Jain Bhawan, Calcutta 1980. Pages xi+312. Price Rs. 50.00
6. UTTARADHYAYANA SUTRA (The Last Testament of Bhagavan Mahavira), Prajnanam, Calcutta, 1977. Pages vii+ 488. Price Rs. 70.00.

1. *Daśavaikālika Sūtra* or *Dasaveyāliya* is one of the four *Mūla Sūtras* of the Svetambara Jainas. It was written by Arya Sayyambhava, fifth head of the order from Mahavira, around 429 B.C. to help in the spiritual progress of his son who was destined to die within six months after initiation. The book is therefore, an important text for any onewho wants to know the rudiments of Jainism, both its philosophy and practice, from a single book.

Based on *Ātmapravāda*, *Karmapravāda*, *Satyapravāda* and *Pratyākhyāna Pūrva*, the *Sūtra* presents in a terse form the most authoritative code of conduct. The work proved so useful that soon after its compilation, it replaced the *Ācārāṅga*, the useful text on conduct, in the curriculum of the study of the monks. It has been a source of inspiration and guidance for them during the past 2300 years.

The book includes Prakrit text, its Sanskrit version and English translation. The translator has presented the most logical exposition keeping clear of the wilderness of conflicting commentaries. The book

will be of immense use for those who intend to know about Jainism from a single text within a short time.

2. The *Kalpa Sūtra* by Bhadrabahu Svami, sixth in the line from Mahavira, is the earliest account of the life of Tirthankaras, especially the 24th, 23rd, 22nd and the 1st. The present work should, in all fitness, occupy a unique position. The *Kalpa Sūtra* belongs to that group of Agamic texts which are called the *Cheda Sūtras*, whose principal theme is rules about the personal behaviour and organisational discipline to be observed by the monks. This *Sūtra* acquires special reverence because of its reference to the Tirthankaras, and with certain sects, it is a compulsory reading during the monsoons when the monks cease their wanderings.

The *Kalpa Sūtra* has been the most popular among the Jaina texts which has attracted the scholars' attention. The earliest English version of this text is by Hermann Jacobi in the *Sacred Books of the East Series* edited by Max Muller. In recent years, quite a few English translations have appeared by lesser writers. The authenticity of the present translation is based on the fact that, like his other works, the translation strictly follows the original text, after critically examining it with reference to Jacobi's version in English on the one hand, and Basanta Kumar Chattopadhyaya's version in Bengali, on the other.

3-5. The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* of the Jainas very rarely used by the laity and used restrictively and sparingly even by the senior Jaina monks, is the biggest single work, almost as big as the rest of the Jaina canonical texts, that the Jaina scholarship ever produced. So far the text in Ardhamagadhi, with some Hindi versions, complete or abridged, was beyond the reach of many scholars. Prof. Lalwani has done a commendable job by taking on hand the translation of this vast work.

Despite its enormous importance, if the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* has never attracted scholars and publishers in the past, it was not only due to its vastness in size which made the work enormously laborious, but also because of the vast range in which are focussed so many diverse themes. The work, apart from containing religion and philosophy of a high order, has also a lot of myths and innumerable secular themes providing information on the political, social and economic conditions of contemporary society, education, polity, economy, different systems of religion, cosmology, geography, even natural sciences. The whole work consists of 41 *śatakas* each containing 10 *uddeśakas*, of diverse sizes, ranging from half a page till a complete book. The usual mode of presentation

is a long dialogue between Mahavira and his principal disciple Indra-bhuti Gautama.

The world at large would not have known much of this work of great significance but for this English version which, apart from being lucid, is the most authentic, following closely as it does the original text. Prof. Lalwani deserves all praise for starting such a strenuous and gigantic work. So far eight *śatakas* have been translated and published with detailed notes in three volumes, each one more than 300 pages, which make a very delightful reading. We hope and pray that Prof. Lalwani may be able to complete the translation of the whole work and get it published during his life time, so that it will be an altogether new window on Jainism, which is one of the earliest religions of this country.*

6. The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* has been rightly called The Last Testament of Bhagavan Mahavira. According to the author of the *Kalpa Sūtra* Bhagavan Mahavira passed away while reciting the 36 *adhyayanas* of the *Sūtra*. As he did this of his own, without provocation or request in the ultimate congregation assembled round him, these inspiring words have come down as his final message to mankind.

The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, like *Daśavaikālika* reviewed above has been classed as one of the *Mūla Sūtras*, which are, technically, slightly lesser than the Agamic texts but by dint of its inherent merit, its great provocation to the followers to get rid of the mundane life and move out in quest of soul, this text has come to acquire an importance which is next to none. It is because of this that the text was chosen for inclusion in the *Sacred Books of the East Series* alluded to earlier and is available in Jacobi's translation.

The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* is one of the few Jaina texts which has been written in verse form, 35 *adhyayanas* out of 36. It goes to the great credit of Prof. Lalwani that he has translated it in exactly the same form original exists, that is the verse form which is an immensely delightful reading, apart from being instructive

*The printing and publication of the first two volumes were financed by the Jain Bhawan., Calcutta. Although volume 3 has been published by the same Jain Bhawan, its finance came from the translator himself Now volume 4 (*Śatakas* 9-11) is ready in mss but cannot be printed for want of finance It will be unfortunate if the production of this valuable work stops at this middle stage It is therefore hoped and requested that some Jaina Organisation, religious trust or generous individual comes forward with financial support and help in the completion of this work.

—*Editor*.

Our Contributors

K. R. CHANDRA, Head, Prakrit and Pali Deptt., School of Languages, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.

ARVIND SHARMA, Deptt. of Religious Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.

B. K. KHADABADI, Reader in Prakrit, Karnataka Arts College, Dharwad.

Y. KRISHAN, New Delhi, author and writer.

PRATIP KUMAR MITRA, Registering Officer, Directorate of Archaeology, West Bengal, Western Circle, Burdwan.

LEONA SMITH KREMSER, Devoted to Tirthankara Aristanemi she is writing His Biography in verse.

Know thou Truth.
He who abides by
The Commandment of Truth
Goes beyond Death.

—Daśavaikālika, 6. 11.

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